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OBLIGATIONS
Bruce V. Schewe*
LEGISLATION
The Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature in 1984 was mon-
umental in this area of the law; Titles III and IV of Book III of the
Civil Code were amended by Act 331, the culmination of the revision
of the law of obligations proposed by the Louisiana State Law Institute.
A complete analysis of Act 331 will appear in a subsequent issue of
the Review.' Accordingly, the new obligations articles will be mentioned
only if the disposition of a discussed judicial opinion would be altered
or if part of the new law would clarify a confusion presently existing
in the jurisprudence. 2 One section of Act 331, however, deserves com-
ment.
Not part of the proposal of the Louisiana State Law Institute,
Section 10 of Act 331, added by the Senate Committee on Judiciary A
to reenact Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:3921, substantively provides as
follows:
A. Notwithstanding any provision in Title III of Code Book III
of Title 9 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950 to the
contrary, every master or employer is answerable for the
damage occasioned by his servant or employee in the exercise
of the functions in which they are employed. Any remission,
transaction, compromise, or other conventional discharge in
favor of the employee for such damage shall be valid as bet-
ween the damaged creditor and the employee and the employer
shall have no right of contribution, division, or indemnifica-
tion from the employee nor shall the employer be allowed
to bring any incidental action under the provisions of Chapter
6 of Title I of Book II of the Louisiana Code of Civil Pro-
cedure against such employee.
Copyright 1985, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Member, Louisiana State and New Orleans Bar Associations; Lecturer on Obli-
gations and Sales, Loyola University School of Law, New Orleans, Louisiana. The author
wishes to thank William M. Meyers, Gene W. Lafitte, Joe B. Norman, and Donna H.
Slocum for their assistance in reading drafts of this article. Any errors or omissions,
however, are the sole responsibility of the writer.
1. 45 La. L. Rev. No. 3 (1985) (forthcoming).
2. For present purposes, and to avoid confusion, the revised articles of the Civil
Code are referred to as "new" and the prior law is designated as existing in the Civil
Code of 1870.
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B. The provisions of this Section are remedial and shall be
applied retrospectively and prospectively to any cause of ac-
tion for damages arising prior to, on, or after the effective
date of this Section.
The ostensible purpose of this statute is to negate legislatively the
indemnity action of the employer against the employee,3 in the event
the employer is required to pay a third person damages for the tortious
conduct of the employee under article 2320 of the Civil Code, 4 when
the employee has been released by the injured creditor. The wisdom of
this change aside, paragraph B of Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:3921 is
of dubious constitutionality.5 Undoubtedly, this statute will spur litigation
and further discussion is deferred until then.
JURISPRUDENCE
While the impact of the reported opinions during the past year
is not as dramatic as the revision of the Civil Code, the decisions
encompassed a variety of subjects, including error as a vice of
consent,' the requisite of a binding contract of compromise,7 unjust
3. See Jobe v. Hodge, 253 La. 483, 218 So. 2d 566 (1969); Williams v. Marionneaux,
240 La. 713, 124 So. 2d 919 (1960), overruled on other grounds, Sampay v. Morton Salt
Co., 395 So. 2d 326 (La. 1981); Little v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 177 So. 2d
784 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965); Comment, The Employer's Indemnity Action, 34 La. L.
Rev. 79 (1973); see also Comment, Tilting Against Windmills: A Solidary Rejoinder, 41
La. L. Rev. 1279 (1981) [cited hereinafter as Tilting Against Windmills]; Comment,
Prescribing Solidarity: Contributing to the Indemnity Dilemma, 41 La. L. Rev. 659 (1981)
[cited hereinafter as Prescribing Solidarity]; Comment, Master's Vicarious Liability for
Torts Under Article 2320: A Terminological "Tar-Baby," 33 La. L. Rev. 110 (1972).
4. The germane part of article 2320 reads as follows: "Masters and employers are
answerable for the damage occasioned by their servants and overseers, in the exercise of
the functions in which they are employed."
5. See, e.g., Green v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 352 So. 2d 366, 369 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 354 So. 2d 210 (La. 1978).
6. E.g., Arena v. K Mart Corp., 439 So. 2d 528, 531 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983)
(stating that an erroneous sale of a television set for $341.05 instead of $609 negated the
contract ab initio).
7. E.g., Crowley Corp. v. Shreveport Packing Co., 440 So. 2d 1345, 1352 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1983) (A separate stock purchase agreement-between maker of a note and
the wife of the president of a corporation which held the note for purchase of the
corporate assets-referring to the remaining balance on the note as thirty payments in
certain amounts each did not result in a compromise of dispute because the wife did not
sign in her capacity as an officer of the corporation, but in her individual capacity, and
there was no written agreement which clearly comprehended that the difference of dispute
of balance would be regulated; since the agreement relied upon was not honored any
alleged compromise contained therein failed for lack of consideration.); Williams v. Winn
Dixie, 447 So. 2d 8, 10 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984) (A "unilateral release" without any
shown or proven consideration does not meet the legal requirements for a valid compromise
under'article 3071 of the Civil Code.); Allan E. Amundson, Inc. v. Hoppmeyer, 442 So.
2d 1254, 1257 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1983) (stating that contract of compromise must be
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enrichment, 8 indemnification agreements, 9 interpretation of contracts,"
and proof of obligations." Surveyed in this selection are the more
noteworthy of these subjects.
Error as a Vice of Consent
Article 1779 of the Civil Code of 1870 specifies four elements to
a valid contract: (1) parties legally capable of contracting; (2) consent
of the parties lawfully given; (3) a permissible object forming the subject
matter of agreement; and (4) a lawful cause. One opinion this year
illustrates the difficulties courts may encounter when considering the
effects of agreements erroneously confected.
Arena v. K Mart Corp.'2 is troublesome not so much for its ultimate
disposition but because of the posture of the litigants. A husband and
a wife brought suit against K Mart in connection with these facts: they,
with their three children, entered a K Mart outlet at Slidell intending
to purchase a new television set; in the display area an assistant manager
aided in selecting a set and advised them that the chosen model sold
for $609.00, plus tax; after the plaintiffs indicated a desire to buy, the
assistant manager informed the cashier that the sale price was $341.05;
this price, plus tax, was paid with a check; the plaintiffs, assisted by
a stock boy, took the television outside of the store and waited for a
signed by both parties) (citing Felder v. Georgia Pac. Corp., 405 So. 2d 521 (La. 1981));
Harrington v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 441 So. 2d 1255, 1257 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983)
(unilateral action by a creditor in altering an indorsement on a check from payment in
full to partial payment in negotiating the instrument will not change the legal import of
its acceptance as an acknowledgment of payment in full satisfaction of the obligation)
(see Hersbergen, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1978-1979 Term-
Commercial Paper and Bank Deposits and Collections, 40 La. L. Rev. 606, 611-15 (1980);
Hersbergen, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1976-1977 Term-
Commercial Paper and Bank Deposits and Collections, 38 La. L. Rev. 384, 392-94 (1978);
Litvinoff, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1974-1975 Term-Contracts
in Particular, 36 La. L. Rev. 417, 426 (1976); Hawkland, The Effect of U.C.C. § 1-207
on the Doctrine of Accord and Satisfaction by Conditional Check, 74 Com. L.J. 329
(1969)).
8. E.g., Creely v. Leisure Living, Inc., 437 So. 2d 816 (La. 1983); Vicari v. Melan-
con, 446 So. 2d 899 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984).
9. E.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Shamrock Constr. Co., 441 So. 2d 379, 383-84
(La. App. 5th Cir. 1983).
10. E.g., Chevron USA v. Martin Exploration Co., 447 So. 2d 469, 472 (La. 1984)
(the word preliminary, by itself, does not necessarily connote a tentative or non-binding
agreement); Franks Petro., Inc. v. Mayo, 438 So. 2d 696, 699 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983)
(A right, title, and interest deed is not necessarily indicative of an intent to quitclaim
and, therefore, may permit the operation of the after acquired-title doctrine.).
11. E.g., Mitchell v. Clark, 448 So. 2d 681, 685 (La. 1984) (A verbal sale of an
immovable is effective if delivery has been made and if the sale is confessed by the
vendor under oath.).
12. 439 So. 2d 528 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 443 So. 2d 585 (La. 1983).
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friend to take them home; the assistant manager then realized that he
had told the cashier the wrong price for the set and so advised the
store manager who instructed the stock boy to retrieve the television;
the manager called the police department and two officers arrived at
the scene; the plaintiffs were advised to obtain a refund and depart.
The plaintiffs subsequently instituted a lawsuit containing an allegation,
apart from other contentions, of conversion.' 3
The district court found for the defendant and dismissed the action.
On appeal, the first circuit affirmed and invoked the principle that "a
contract may be invalidated by a unilateral error . . . where the other
party knew or should have known it was the principal cause.' ' 4 Since
the court was convinced that the plaintiffs knew the true sale price to
be $609.00, and not $341.05, the consent necessary for a valid sale was
vitiated. 5 The claim of conversion therefore fell because the appellate
panel agreed with "the findings of the trial court regarding the status
of the contract for the sale of the television set .... ,,16
In dissent, Judge Watkins noted that under article 1881 of the Civil
Code of 1870,17 "[e]ngagements entered into through . . . error are not
absolutely null, but are voidable by the parties."' 8 As a consequence,
it was "necessary for K Mart to pursue action in the courts to set aside
the sale. For the employees of K Mart to attempt by force to obtain
the return of the television set constituted a tortious violation of the
Arenas' right of ownership."' 9
Judge Watkins' statements are insightful and correct. The type of
self-help action undertaken by the employees of K Mart should not be
countenanced in the law. 20 As was ultimately proven in this lawsuit, K
13. The plaintiffs also sued for damages resulting from mental and emotional stress.
14. 439 So. 2d at 530 (citing La. Civ. Code arts. 1819 & 1823 (1870)). See Nugent
v. Stanley, 336 So. 2d 1058 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976); Deutschmann v. Standard Fur Co.,
331 So. 2d 219 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976).
15. The written reasons of the district court were quoted:
Receiving the sum of $609.00 plus tax was certainly the principal cause that K
Mart had for entering into the sales contract with the Arenas. The court is also
convinced that Mr. Arena knew that the true sale price amounted to $609.00,
and that he elected to take advantage of Callaway's mistake. Under these
circumstances the error of fact on the part of Callaway vitiated the consent
necessary to make the transaction a valid sale.
439 So. 2d at 530.
16. Id.
17. La. Civ. Code art. 1881 (1870) ("Engagements made through error, violence,
fraud or menace, are not absolutely null, but are voidable by the parties, who have
contracted under the influence of such error, fraud, violence or menace, or by represen-
tatives of such parties.").
18. 439 So. 2d at 531 (Watkins, J., dissenting).
19. Id.
20. The writer previously has reflected upon the denial of "the concept of self-help"
in the law of Louisiana. Comment, Civilian Thoughts on U.C.C. Section 9-503 Self-Help
[Vol. 45
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Mart labored under material error (by reason of the inadvertedness of
its employees) in forming a contract with the plaintiffs, but this error
cast upon the agreement only the shadow of a relative nullity. 2 Pres-
umptively, the contract of sale was valid and, consequently, ownership
of the television set passed to Mr. and Mrs. Arena. 22 While "K Mart
was free to pursue action in the courts to have the sale set aside for
error . . . until judgment was secured . . . the television set belonged
to the Arenas." ' 23 Simply put, the contract cannot be said to have been
void.
Certainly, the limited stress and privacy intrusion suffered by the
purchasers influenced the outcome of the case; after all, they were barely
outside of the store when the problem arose. Be that as it may, the
employees of K Mart had no more right unilaterally to declare the
contract rescinded and take back the television set in the parking lot
than if the buyers had arrived home before the price discrepency was
detected. In the latter situation, no one should question the lack of
authority of employees of K Mart to recover the television without
judicial supervision.
Lawful Cause and Objects for Agreements
Occasionally issues are raised concerning the validity of agreements
by reason of alleged unlawfulness of cause or object. 24 In at least two
instances during the past year the illegality of objects of agreements
resulted in the rejection of contractual claims brought by plaintiffs.
Schwegmann v. Schwegmann 21 essentially involved a palimony claim
with the plaintiff asserting, among other things, a right to recover
compensation for services rendered to Mr. Schwegmann under a theory
of either quasi-contract or quantum meruit. In support of this contention,
the plaintiff stated that she had performed domestic services, including
Repossession: Reasoning in a Historical Vacuum, 42 La. L. Rev. 239, 267 (1981). As a
philosophical matter, "the law aids the person physically detaining the thing because of
this fact, not by reason of a presumed right to possess .. .; the [possessory] action is
for the benefit of the person and not the property. In denying self-help, admittedly, the
factual status quo is maintained. But, even more importantly, the individual liberty of
persons and the maintenance of public order are guaranteed." Id. at 259 (citing F. v.
Savigny, Treatise on Possession or the Jus Possessionis of the Civil Law 27 (E. Perry
trans. 6th ed. 1848)).
21. La. Civ. Code art. 1881 (1870). Under the authority of article 1882 of the Civil
Code of 1870, K Mart may have pursued an action to avoid the contract.
22. La. Civ. Code art. 2456.
23. 439 So. 2d at 531 (Watkins, J., dissenting).
24. E.g., Rosenblath v. Sanders, 150 La. 882, 91 So. 252 (1922) (lease for purposes
of prostitution); Martin v. Seabaugh, 128 La. 442, 54 So. 935 (1911) (gambling); Lamy
v. Will, 140 So. 2d 794 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962) (gambling).
25. 441 So. 2d 316 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1983).
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cooking, cleaning, chauffeuring, and nursing. She also admitted, how-
ever, that she and Mr. Schwegmann had engaged in sexual activities
throughout the relationship. 26 It was undisputed that the sexual rela-
tionship was one of the reasons Mr. Schwegmann supported the plaintiff.
Since it was established by the evidence that the domestic services per-
formed by the plaintiff were "inextricably interwoven with sexual services
in a concubinage relationship, ' 27 the court concluded that any promise
of support made by the defendant was "unenforceable because it is an
unlawful contract for meretricious services." 28
The declaration by the court that illicit sexual services cannot be
separated from other lawful activities appears to be consistent with the
views expressed by the courts of Illinois, 29 New York,30 and Georgia. 3'
Given the exceedingly strong public policy concerns at play, if a different
resolution is desired, "[p]erhaps the legislature should take the lead in
searching for solutions to this problem. 32 In any event, as one writer
has remarked, the "legal system will have to deal with this complex
and troublesome problem with increasing frequency, and society has a
26. In the words of the fifth circuit, she and Mr. Schwegmann had sexual relations
"(1) on their first date in October or November of 1958; (2) throughout the time they
dated before living together; (3) while they lived together in his house; and (4) when she
visited after she left his house .... ".Id. at 324.
27. Id.
28. Id. (citing Sparrow v. Sparrow, 231 La. 966, 93 So. 2d 232 (1957); Delamour
v. Roger, 7 La. Ann. 152 (1852); Foshee v. Simkin, 174 So. 2d 915 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1965)). In order for a concubine to recover on the quasi-contract theories put forth by
the plaintiff, presumably "strict and conclusive proof" is required that the lawful services
were not intertwined with sexual favors. This is the test for property disputes. Broadway
v. Broadway, 417 So. 2d 1272, 1276 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 422 So. 2d 162
(La. 1982).
29. E.g., Hewitt v. Hewitt, 77 I11. 2d 49, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (1979). A commentator
has accurately capsulized the background in Hewitt:
In this case the non-marital cohabitation commenced while the parties were in
college and continued for seventeen years. During this period the man completed
his education (in dentistry), established a successful practice, and the couple
had raised three children. As a successful dentist, the man had accumulated
considerable property, all in his name. The Illinois Appellate Court had held
that the complaint stated a cause of action, relying heavily on Marvin v. Marvin,
18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106 (1976), but the Illinois Supreme Court reversed,
rejecting the Marvin holding that the property agreement could be separated
from the cohabitation, and relying on the long standing Illinois rule as to the
illegality of such agreements, held that the agreement was not enforceable...
• The court felt that a change in long standing public policy was a matter for
the legislature, not the courts.
W. McClanahan, Community Property in the United States § 5:27, at 325 n.9 (1982).
30. E.g., Morone v. Morone, 50 N.Y.2d 481, 429 N.Y.S.2d 592, 413 N.E.2d 1154
(1980).
31. E.g., Rehak v. Mathis, 239 Ga. 541, 238 S.E.2d 81 (1977).
32. W. McClanahan, supra note 29, § 5:27, at 327.
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right to expect that the legislatures and the courts will produce results
that are fair and equitable and acceptable . . . ."
In A Better Place, Inc. v. Giani Investment Co.,14 the supreme court
considered the illegality of an object of a contract in a more novel
setting. The plaintiff had commenced separate lawsuits against the de-
fendant to recover the balances due on open accounts for merchandise
sold and delivered, including drug paraphernalia removed from the per-
missible stream of commerce by the Drug Paraphernalia Act of 1980. 31
According to the court, a determination that the contraband items were
included in the sales from the plaintiff to the defendant mandated no
recovery for that portion of the sued upon shipments because "a judicial
demand for payment of obligations relating to objects which are illegal
or contrary to public order or morals will not be entertained." '36
Extinguishment of Obligations
Article 2130 of the Civil Code of 1870 contains a list of the methods
of extinguishment of obligations.17 Recited therein is remission, and its
special rules are stated in articles 2199 through 2206. Of the provisions
on remission, article 2203 probably has generated as many disputes over
the years as any other part of the Civil Code treating devices of
extinguishing obligations. 38 On its face, the tenor of the statute appears
relatively clear:
33. Id.
34. 445 So. 2d 728 (La. 1984).
35. La. R.S. 40:1031-1036 (Supp. 1980), added by 1980 La. Acts, No. 669. The
constitutionality of the act was upheld in Tobacco Accessories & Novelty Craftsmen
Merchants Ass'n v. Treen, 681 F.2d 378 (5th Cir. 1982).
36. 445 So. 2d at 732.
37. La. Civ. Code art. 2130 (1870) ("Obligations are extinguished: By payment. By
novation. By voluntary remission. By compensation. By confusion. By the loss of the
thing. By nullity or rescission. By the effect of the dissolving condition, which has been
explained in the preceding chapter. By prescription, which shall be treated in a subsequent
title.").
38. E.g., Sampay v. Morton Salt Co., 395 So. 2d 326 (La. 1981); First Nat'l Bank
v. Green Garden Processing Co., 387 So. 2d 1070 (La. 1980); Louisiana Bank & Trust
Co. v. Boutte, 309 So. 2d 274 (La. 1975); Wisconsin Capital Corp. v. Trans World Land
Title Corp., 378 So. 2d 495 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979). See Rubin, Developments in the
Law, 1979-1980-Security Devices, 41 La. L. Rev. 389, 390 (1981); 'Rubin, The Work of
the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1978-1979 Term-Security Devices, 40 La. L. Rev.
572, 572 (1980); Harrell, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1974-1975
Term-Security Devices, 36 La. L. Rev. 437, 443-44 (1975); Note, Green Garden: Short
Shrift for the Solidary Surety, 41 La. L. Rev. 968 (1981); Note, Aiavolasiti: A Conflict
Resolved, A Conflict Ignored, 40 La. L. Rev. 483 (1980); Note, Rights of the Solidary
Surety: Louisiana.Bank & Trust Co. v. Boutte, 36 La. L. Rev. 279 (1975); Note, Security
Rights-Suretyship-Release of Principal Debtor Does Not Discharge Solidary Surety, 49
Tul. L. Rev. 1187 (1975).
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The remission or conventional discharge in favor of one of
the codebtors in solido, discharges all the others, unless the
creditor has expressly reserved his right against the latter.
In the latter case, he cannot claim the debt without making
a deduction of the part of him to whom he has made the
remission.
In construing article 2203, however, the courts consistently have been
faced with two problems: (1) a working definition of the "expressly
reserved" language in the first paragraph;3 9 and (2) the meaning of the
second paragraph.4 0
In the aftermath of the decision in Fridge v. Caruthers,4 the first
portion of the article has been read in the following manner:
This article of our Code is a literal translation of article 1285
of the French Code. The French commentators are unanimous
in holding that the article means just what it says: From the
fact that the creditor renounces his right as to one (of the
solidary debtors) the law concludes that he intends to renounce
his right as to all. Each of the solidary obligors is liable for
the whole debt as principal debtor to the creditors and is only
liable as surety to his codebtors, and that is why the creditor
may not discharge one without discharging the others.4 2
Article 2203, consequently, may operate as a trap for an unwary
plaintiff-creditor in reaching a settlement agreement with one of several
solidary debtors. 43 If claims are not reserved expressly against the un-
released solidary obligors, then the debtors in solido who were likely
not intended to be discharged would be released nonetheless. To counter
this harsh result, the courts have adopted this rule:
There is nothing sacramental about the form in which the re-
servation shall be made, and, since no one is presumed to
renounce a right unless it clearly appear that he intended to do
so, it follows that it suffices that the intention to reserve the
right against codebtors may be inferred from any expression in
the release of one codebtor which negatives the intent to release
the other codebtors. 44
39. E.g., Cusimano v. Ferrara, 170 La. 1044, 129 So. 630, 632 (1930); Fridge v.
Caruthers, 156 La. 746, 752, 101 So. 128, 130 (1924). See also Honeycutt v. Town of
Boyce, 341 So. 2d 327, 331 (La. 1977); Dobard v. State Farm Ins. Co., 437 So. 2d 366,
367 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983).
40. E.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Green Garden Processing Co., 387 So. 2d 1070 (La.
1980); Louisiana Bank & Trust Co. v. Boutte, 309 So. 2d 274 (La. 1975).
41. 156 La. 746, 101 So. 128 (1924).
42. 156 La. at 752, 101 So. at 130.
43. E.g., Billeaudeau v. Lemoine, 386 So. 2d 1359 (La. 1980).
44. Cusimano v. Ferrara, 170 La. 1044, 1047, 129 So. 630, 632 (1930).
[Vol. 45
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In this vein, during the past term, the supreme court somehow
managed to construe the following language to contain an express re-
servation of rights:
It is further agreed that in the event other parties are responsible
to me/us for damages as a result of this accident, the execution
of this agreement shall operate as a satisfaction of my/our claim
against such other parties to the extent of the pro-rata share of
the parties herein.4 5
While the correctness of this interpretation is open to debate, for
good or for bad, this subject will soon occupy nothing more than an
historical footnote. New article 1803 of the Civil Code, effective January
1, 1985, states that the remission of the debt by the obligee in favor
of one obligor "benefits the other solidary obligors in the amount of
the portion of that obligor." Recognition is given in the reporter's
comments that the law previously reflected by article 2203 has been
changed insofar as the "remission of debt in favor of one obligor does
not extinguish the solidary obligation, but only reduces it for the other
obligors in the amount of the remitted share." '4 6 So goes another trap
for the unwary.
Subrogation
In a cryptic opinion, Aizpurua v. Crane Pool Co.,4 7 the supreme
court dealt with issues of subrogation and the distinctions between sales
and building contracts, but resolved neither. The facts of the case are
fairly straightforward: the plaintiffs, a husband and a wife, purchased
a house on December 6, 1977; prior to the purchase of the home,
specifically in 1976, Crane Pool Company constructed and installed a
swimming pool in the yard; problems with the pool, including separation
of the liner from the cement wall and cracks in the coping, first appeared
in December of 1979; and on May 29, 1981, the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit
against their vendors, Crane Pool Company and/or Corey Crane, and
the property development company. In the trial court, Crane Pool
Company and Corey Crane raised the peremptory exceptions of no cause
45. Roy v. U.S.A.A. Cas. Ins. Co., 453 So. 2d 564, 567 (La. 1984).
46. In this connection, comment (b) provides the following:
In case of transaction, compromise, or settlement between the obligee and one
of the solidary obligors, the liability of the other solidary obligors is reduced
in the amount of the portion of that obligor, as in the case of settlement
between the victim of a tort and one joint tort-feasor. See Wall v. American
Employers Insurance Company, 386 So. 2d 79 (La. 1980); Canter v. Koehring
Company, 283 So. 2a 716 (La. 1973); Cunningham v. Hardware Mutual Casualty
Company, 228 So. 2d 700 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969); Harvey v. The Travelers
Insurance Company, 163 So. 2d 915 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
47. 449 So. 2d 471 (La. 1984).
19841
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of action, no right of action, and prescription which were sustained
upon the basis that the actions in redhibition and tort had prescribed
and that no privity of contract existed between the plaintiffs and Crane
Pool Company and/or Corey Crane. These rulings were affirmed by
the intermediate appellate court. 4
In reversing in part and affirming in part, the court, through Justice
Watson, noted "[tihe trial court correctly found that any actions
in tort and redhibition against Crane had prescribed. ' ' 49 Thus, the ques-
tion remaining for resolution was "whether plaintiffs had a right of
action against Crane for breach of any implied or express warranty in
the Crane building contract with the Smiths [the vendors]." 50 The phras-
ing of this query necessarily indicates, without explanation or analysis,
that the proper classification of the agreement entered into between the
vendors of the plaintiffs and Crane Pool Company and/or Corey Crane
was a lease of labor or industry" or a so-called "building contract,"
not a contract of sale. Although this conclusion may have been right,
no account is given why the primary obligation of Crane Pool Company
was not one to give, in the sense of delivery (an obligation flowing
from the contract of sale),5 2 but rather an obligation to do. 3 It should
not be overlooked that the lines of demarcation between contracts of
sale and building contracts have been hotly contested and never have
been particularly clear in the jurisprudence. 4 Since few facts are detailed
in the opinion of the supreme court, it is difficult to determine whether
or not the conclusion reached is proper.5
Less unsatisfactory from an analytical standpoint, and commendable
from a result-oriented perspective, is the treatment of subrogation:
48. Aizpurua v. Crane Pool Co., 439 So. 2d 572 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983).
49. 449 So. 2d at 472 (citing La. Civ. Code arts. 2546 & 3536).
50. Id.
51. See La. Civ. Code arts. 2756-2777.
52. See Levasseur, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1977-1978
Term-Sales, 39 La. L. Rev. 705, 709-15 (1979).
53. See La. Civ. Code arts. 1761 & 1905 (1870).
54. E.g., Hunt v. Suares, 9 La. 434 (1836); FMC Corp. v. Continental Grain Co.,
355 So. 2d 953 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977); Jefferson Parish School Bd. v. Rowley Co.,
350 So. 2d 187 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977); Henson v. Gonzalez, 326 So. 2d 396 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1976); Vico Concrete Co. v. Antley, 283 So. 2d 830 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1973);
Kegler's v. Levy, 239 So. 2d 450 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970). See also S. Litvinoff, Sale
and Lease in the Louisiana Jurisprudence 1-22 (1983); Levasseur, supra note 52, at 710-
15.
55. Perhaps a reiteration of the sentiments expressed by Professor Levasseur several
years ago in this Review is appropriate at this juncture:
A faithful characterization of a contract should, therefore, include an analysis
of the requirements of: first, the subjective cause of the contract; second, the
requirement of consent, especially under its aspect of error as to the person
which is almost always irrelevant in a contract of sale but quite important in
a contract of industry; and third, an analysis of the object of the contract.
Levasseur, supra note 52, at 713.
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The Aizpuruas were subrogated to the Smiths' rights and actions
in warranty against "all others." LSA-C.C. Art. 2503. This
article has been interpreted as including only actions against
other vendors. See LeBlanc v. Ellerbee Builders, Inc., 317 So.2d
1 (La. App. I Cir. 1975). This reading of the article erroneously
qualifies its literal language. "[T]he right to sue for breach of
warranty of quality is transmitted with the object of the sale."
XIV Tul. L. Rev. at p. 471. The implied warranty of materials
and workmanship in a building contract is one to which a
subsequent purchaser is subrogated. Media [Production Con-
sulting, Inc. v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc., 262 La.
80, 262 So.2d 377 (1973)]. Despite lack of privity, one who
acquires immovable property can enforce a contract made for
the improvement of the property by the person from whom he
acquired it. LSA-C.C. art. 2011; Breaux v. Laird, 223 La. 446,
65 So. 2d 907 (1953).56
Notably absent from this discussion is any mention of a conventional
subrogation of the plaintiffs to the right of the vendors against Crane
Pool Company and/or Corey Crane. 7 The statements of the court and
the rationale for the decision, therefore, are matters of law, not con-
tractual interpretation.
To the extent the court in Aizpurua v. Crane Pool Co. relied upon
article 2011 of the Civil Code of 187058 to support its ruling, the
reasoning is of doubtful validity and will be short-lived. Admittedly,
three decades ago the court interpreted article 2011 to permit a purchaser
of a house to sue the surety on the contractor's performance bond for
alleged non-completion of the construction contract and defective work,
when the bond and the building contract were viewed as inseparable. 9
Without doubt, the court again read article 2011 literally but, unfor-
tunately, did not consider the possible impact of its analysis upon the
meaning of real rights and real obligations.
The contract entered into between Crane Pool Company and the
vendors of the Aizpuruas certainly does not fit within the modes listed
in article 2012 of the Civil Code of 1870 for creating real obligations. 60
56. 449 So. 2d 473. A good discussion of the Media Production Consulting case is
contained in Note, Sales-Implied Warranty-Wholesale Distributor Liable for Retail Price
of Defective Foreign Automobile, 47 Tul. L. Rev. 473 (1973).
57. The deed was not submitted in evidence at the trial.
58. Article 2011 of the Civil Code of 1870 states as follows:
Not only the obligation, but the right resulting from a contract relative to
immovable property, passes with the property. Thus the right of servitude in
favor of immovable property, passes with it, and thus also the heir or other
acquirer will have the right to enforce a contract made for the improvement
of the property by the person from whom he acquired it.
59. Breaux v. Laird, 223 La. 446, 449-52, 65 So. 2d 907, 908-09 (1953).
60. Article 2012 of the Civil Code of 1870 provides this:
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To amplify, it should seem unusual to conclude that Crane Pool Com-
pany held corresponding real rights against the Aizpuruas, say for any
unpaid credit portion of the pool, merely because of the sale of the
property with the improvement, 6' without the necessity of filing notice
of a lien. 62 Moreover, the agreement between Crane Pool Company and
the vendors of the Aizpuruas did not affect the ownership of the
property, which is truly the issue in classifying real rights and real
obligations.6
Fortunately, an extended canvassing of this subject is not needed.
Article 2011 of the Civil Code of 1870 has been suppressed legislatively.
New article 1764 of the Civil Code treats the effects of real obligations:
A real obligation is transferred to the universal or particular
successor who acquires the movable or immovable thing to which
the obligation is attached, without a special provision to that
effect.
But a particular successor is not personally bound, unless he
assumes the personal obligations of his transferor with respect
to the thing, and he may liberate himself of the real obligation
by abandoning the thing.
Although not entirely clear from the text of new article 1764, com-
ment (d) specifically addresses the problem raised in Aizpurua:
Real obligations may be created in three ways:
1. By the alienation of immovable property, subject to a real condition, either
expressed or implied by law.
2. By alienating to one person the immovable property, and to another, some
real right to be exercised upon it.
3. By the creation of a right of mortgage upon the immovable property.
All these contracts give rise to obligations purely real on the part of those who
acquire the land, under whatever species of title they possess it; they are not
personally liable, but the real property is, and, by abandoning it to the obligee,
they relieve themselves from all responsibility.
A sale subject to a rent charge, or to a right of redemption as consideration
of the sale, are examples of the first kind of obligations; servitudes, the right
of use and habitation and usufruct, are examples of the second; and the several
kinds of mortgages, and the creation of a rent charge, of the third.
61. The solution to this problem offered by article 2012 of the Civil Code of 1870
does not appear satisfactory: The contracts "give rise to obligations purely real on the
part of those who acquire the land, under whatever species of title they possess it; they
are not personally liable, but the real property is, and, by abandoning it to the obligee,
they relieve themselves from all responsibility."
62. See La. R.S. 9:4801-4842 (Supp. 1982).
63. "Strictly speaking, real obligations are always duties incidental and correlative to
real rights. They are obligations in the sense that they are duties imposed on a particular
person who owns or possesses a thing subject to a real right, and they are real in the
sense that, as correlative of a real right, these obligations attach to a particular thing
and are transferred with it without the need of an express assignment or subrogation."
A. Yiannopoulos, Property § 143, at 381-82, in 2 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (2d ed.
1980). For Professor Yiannopoulas's critique of article 2011, see id. § 141, at 371-72.
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A particular successor, that is, one who acquires a thing by
particular title, is not bound by the personal obligations of his
author with respect to the thing, unless he has assumed these
obligations by delegation. Conversely, a particular successor does
not acquire, without stipulation to that effect, any personal rights
that his author has with respect to the thing. For example, if
the owner of an immovable who has made a contract for its
repair sells the immovable, the purchaser is not bound to perform
the obligation of the owner under the repair contract unless he
assumes that obligation. Conversely, the purchaser is not bound
to perform the obligation of the owner under the repair contract
unless he assumes that obligation. Conversely, the purchaser
does not acquire any right under the repair contract unless such
a right is assigned to him. Civil Code Article 2011 (1870) has
been suppressed because its provisions are conceptually incon-
sistent with other provisions of Louisiana law. 64
Under the holding of Aizpurua v. Crane Pool Co., however, an
assignment or conventional subrogation in favor of the purchaser is not
necessary for the buyer to acquire rights under a repair contract entered
into by the vendor and a third person concerning the property sold.
The purchaser is subrogated, according to the expansive interpretation
of article 2503 of the Civil Code, to the rights of the seller. 65
The next inquiry is what type of subrogation is thereby effected.
New article 1829 of the Civil Code provides an answer in its treatment
of legal subrogation:
64. Furthermore, comment (g) notes that articles 2011 through 2014 and 2016 through
2019 of the Civil Code of 1876 "have not been reproduced because they are unnecessary
in light of other provisions of the Civil Code,"
65. This conclusion is not new. McEachern v. Plauche Lumber & Constr. Co., 220
La. 696, 707, 57 So. 2d 405, 408 (1952) (noting that "the buyer is subrogated to the
seller's right to action in warranty against all others, Atticle 2503, Civil Code"). Mack
Barham, former Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of Louisiana and former Professor
of Law at Tulane University, has written that while "[e]xtending article 2503 in this
manner meets the problem of the privity requirement . . . there are several problems
encountered in extending the article as the courts have done." Barham, Redhibition: A
Comparative Comment, 49 Tul. L. Rev. 376, 383 (1975). The difficulties are at least two-
fold: for the action in warranty to be available, the defect in the thing or the work must
have existed at the time of the sale; and if the immediate vendor's right of action has
prescribed then the purchaser can claim nothing by reason of subrogation, since "[i]t is
well settled that a subrogee can have no greater rights than the subrogor." Reliance Ins.
Co. v. Tadlock, 420 So. 2d 548, 549 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1982). Accordingly, Mr. Barham
has offered this suggestion:
Rather than extending article 2503 as the courts have tended to do in the past,
an alternative, consonant with civilian methodology and our heritage of civil
law, would be to analogize to the warranty against eviction in article 2503 when
dealing with a case involving a warranty against redhibitory vices. Article 2475
states that the seller is bound to two principal obligations, that of delivering
19841
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Subrogation takes place by operation of law:
(1) In favor of an obligee who pays another obligee whose right is
preferred to his because of a privilege, pledge, or mortgage
(2) In favor of a purchaser of movable or immovable property who
uses the purchase money to pay a creditor holding any privilege,
pledge, or mortgage on the property;
(3) In favor of an obligor who pays a debt he owes with others or
for others and who has recourse against those others as a result
of the payment;
(4) In favor of an heir with benefit of inventory who paid the debts
of the estate with his own funds; and
(5) In other cases provided by law."
Surely, the construction of article 2503 allowing the subrogation of pur-
chasers to the rights of vendors is a case provided by law, within the
meaning of paragraph 5 of new article 1829.
Contribution and Indemnification
Just over five years ago, the supreme court in Thomas v. W & W
Clarklift, Inc.67 foreshadowed its later redefinition of solidary obligors
in Foster v. Hampton6s by viewing a company which had repaired an
overhauled machine causing personal injury as a potential solidary ob-
ligor with executive officers of the employer of the claimant. In Thomas,
the plaintiff, an employee of Dennis Sheen Transfer Company, was
injured when a forklift fell on him. The machine had been purchased
as a used item from W & W Clarklift, which had overhauled it. A
lawsuit was instituted against W & W Clarklift and its insurer under
theories of negligence and breach of warranties. Twenty-nine months
after the employee's action had been filed, the principal defendants
brought third party demands against officers and supervisory personnel
of Dennis Sheen Transfer Company, alleging negligence in failing to
discover the forklift's unsafe condition and seeking contribution or in-
demnity. After the fourth circuit affirmed on the basis of prescription, 69
the Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed and ruled that W & W Clarklift
may have been a solidary obligor with the Dennis Sheen Transfer Com-
and that of warranting the thing which he sells. It is arguable that these two
obligations are conjunctive and indivisible because delivery constitutes title, and
eviction or redhibitory vices result in the buyer not having bought what he
intended to buy, and, figuratively speaking, he is dispossessed of title in the
thing he thought he had purchased. Thus, if an object purchased is unfit for
the use intended, the end result parallels dispossession and is analogizable thereto.
Barham, supra (footnote omitted).
66. La. Civ. Code art. 1829.
67. 375 So. 2d 375 (La. 1979).
68. 381 So. 2d 789 (La. 1980).
69. 365 So. 2d 913, 918 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979).
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pany's supervisory employees and that therefore an intradebtor action
potentially was available. 70 The case was remanded to the trial court.
In the ensuing years, the demands brought by the personal injury
plaintiff were settled and the third-party claim of W & W Clarklift was
dismissed after a trial on the merits. An appeal was taken and the
fourth circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court in a significant
opinion." To the appellate panel, with Judge Redmann as the author,
the primary issue was whether the assumed solidary liability of W &
W Clarklift and the executive officers of Dennis Sheen Transfer Company
to the personal injury plaintiff entitled W & W Clarklift to contribution
under article 2103 of the Civil Code of 1870 or whether the "affair .
. . concern[ed] only one of the co-obligors in solido," in which case
"that one is liable for the whole debt toward the other co-debtors,"
as envisioned by article 2106 of the Civil Code.7 2 The court resolved
the contest in favor of the executive officers:
We conclude that any liability the [executive officers] might have
is not the result of their personal fault but only of a vicarious
or strict liability for the fault of Clarklift, and that therefore,
in the words of C.C. 2106, the affair concerns only Clarklift
and Clarklift is liable for the whole debt towards the [executive
officers].73
In so ruling, the fourth circuit confirmed the prediction of the
United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Carter v. EPSCO, Inc.
74
70. 375 So. 2d at 378.
71. 444 So. 2d 1300 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984).
72. Id. at 1302. The full text of article 2106 of the Civil Code of 1870 reads as
follows: "If the affair for which the debt has been contracted in solido, concern only
one of the co-obligors in solido, that one is liable for the whole debt towards the other
co-debtors, who, with regard to him, are considered only as his securities." The policy
underlying article 2106 of the Civil Code of 1870 has been carried forth in new article
1804 which states that "[ilf the circumstances giving rise to the solidary obligation concern
only one of the obligors, that obligor is liable for the whole to the other obligors who
are then considered only as his sureties."
73. 444 So. 2d at 1302. Essays on the subject of contribution and indemnification
include: Holloman, Contribution Between Tort-Feasors: Treatment By the Courts of Lou-
isiana, 19 Tul. L. Rev. 254 (1944), Redmann, Louisiana Civil Code Principles of Con-
tribution and Indemnity: Solidary Obligations and Suretyship, 17 Loyola L. Rev. 297
(1971), Tilting Against Windmills, supra note 3, at 1285-90, and Prescribing Solidarity,
supra note 3, at 701-06.
74. 681 F.2d 1062, 1066-67 (5th Cir. 1982):
An "innocent" debtor held liable in solido for the creditor's protection may
have the recourse of indemnification against a co-obligor who is the actual
wrongdoer. This equitable adjustment of rights among solidarily bound debtors
has been recognized by the Supreme Court of Louisiana. Appalachian Corp.
v. Brooklyn Cooperage Co. and Sutton v. Champagne are early examples. See
Johnson, Developments in the Law, 1979-1980-Obligations, 41 La. L. Rev.
355, 358 (1981). And we find in the Civil Code section titled "Of the Rules
Which Govern Obligations with Respect to Debtors In Solido," article 2106,
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on this matter and decided in accord with the views recently expressed
in this Review."
Very recently, in Dusenbery v. McMoran Exploration Co.," the
supreme court, in reversing the rulings of the trial and the intermediate
appellate courts, correctly followed the principles set forth previously
in Appalachian Corp. v. Brooklyn Cooperage Co." and summarized the
following standard regarding indemnification: "When liability to the
injured party is imposed on one party on the basis of strict liability
only and on a second party on the basis of negligence or actual fault,
the strict liability defendant may recover full indemnity by incidental
demand against the party actually at fault.""8 The rationale for this rule
is simple and straightforward:
While both defendants are liable to the injured party, the de-
fendant who is liable only as the owner of the unreasonably
dangerous structure should be made whole by the defendant
who actually caused the unreasonably dangerous condition for
which the owner is strictly liable. As between the two defendants,
ultimate responsibility rests with the party who was actually at
fault, and the fact that the law imposed liability on the owner
to the injured party does not detract from the owner's right to
indemnification against the party who actually created the dan-
gerous condition. 79
These statements are consistent with the analysis of the fourth circuit
in Thomas v. W & W Clarklift, Inc.
Although much is to be applauded in the Dusenbery opinion, foot-
note 1, gratutitious in that an employer-employee situation was not
before the court, is bothersome. In an attempt to explain its position
on indemnification in cases involving vicarious liability, the court noted,
"[ilt is doubtful that indemnity would be allowed to an employer against
an employee for simple negligence, since such recovery is contrary to
the very purpose of imposing vicarious liability on an employer who
benefits from the services of the employee in the course of his em-
which, while somewhat cryptic in its phraseology, supports this ultimate ap-
portionment of the responsibility of solidary obligors. Article 2106 ordains that
"if the affair for which the debt has been contracted in solido, concerns only
one of the coobligors in solido, that one is liable for the whole debt towards
the other codebtors, who, with regard to him, are considered only as his securities."
75. See Johnson, Developments in the Law, 1979-80-Obligations, 41 La. L. Rev.
355, 358 (1981); Tilting Against Windmills, supra note 3, at 1285-90; Prescribing Solidarity,
supra note 3, at 710-15.
76. 458 So. 2d 102 (La. 1984).
77. 151 La. 41, 91 So. 539 (1922).
78. 458 So. 2d at 105 (emphasis in original).
79. Id. (emphasis in original).
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ployment." 80 Perplexing indeed is the idea that an employer is not entitled
to indemnification or reimbursement from its negligent employees because
of the principles of vicarious liability, for indemnification has been the
long standing judicial rule and was ordered as recently as 1981 by the
first circuit.81 While the issue of indemnification of an employer by an
employee may soon be academic, 82 pause should be caused by the
statement that reimbursement is contrary to the purposes of vicarious
responsibility. The liability of an employer, "purely legal or statutory
in nature," merely provides "the plaintiff-creditor with a solvent obligor
. . ,"3 The statutory grounding of the answerability under article
2320 of the Civil Code, even as a solidary debtor, however, is not
significant between the employer and the employee. Once the plaintiff-
creditor has been satisfied, no reason exists to suggest that the employer
should bear all of the loss. Upon this premise, Professor Johnson astutely
has asked the following question: "[W]hat public policy is being served
by insulating the wrongdoer from even the possibility of relieving his
employer of the burden of his wrongdoing?" 4
A re-thinking of the validity of the sentiments expressed in footnote
I of Dusenbery v. McMoran Exploration Co. seems in order. If the
issues of contribution and indemnification between and among solidary
obligors are to be resolved properly, careful analysis is needed of the
tenets underlying each obligor's indebtedness. And debtors actually at
fault should be required to indemnify other obligors in solido, called
upon to pay creditors.
Unjust Enrichment
In the seventeen years since life was breathed into the actio de in
rem verso, or unjust enrichment action, by the supreme court in Minyard
80. Id. at 104 n.l.
81. Curry v. Iberville Parish Sheriff's Office, 405 So. 2d 1387, 1391 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 410 So. 2d 1130 (La. 1982). See Robertson, Ruminations on
Comparative Fault, Duty-Risk Analysis, Affirmative Defenses, and Defensive Doctrines
in Negligence and Strict Liability Litigation in Louisiana, 44 La. L. Rev. 1341, 1383
(1984). Caution is urged in reviewing this work, however. Although Professor Robertson's
article is very thought provoking and illuminating in many respects, the writer completely
disagrees with the suggestion that Sampay v. Morton Salt Co., 395 So. 2d 326 (La. 1981),
"implicitly overruled the right of indemnification" of the employer. Robertson, supra, at
1384. This reading of Sampay is at least as "radical" as the idea that the released
"tortfeasor employee is no longer protected by the receipt and release from an indemnity
action." Id. at 1383-84 n.223. Critical commentary exists regarding Sampay v. Morton
Salt Co.; see Johnson, Developments in the Law, 1980-1981 -Obligations, 42 La. L. Rev.
388 (1982); Tilting Against Windmills, supra note 3.
82. La. R.S. 9:3921 (Supp. 1984). See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
83. Prescribing Solidarity, supra note 3, at 695.
84. Johnson, supra note 81, at 396.
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v. Curtis Products, Inc.," many plaintiffs otherwise unable to bring
claims to a successful end have seized upon the theory. Relatively few,
however, are able to satisfy the five criteria for the action, as outlined
in Minyard and the later seminal opinion in Edmonston v. A-Second
Mortgage Co.:86 (1) an enrichment on the part of the defendant; (2) an
impoverishment on the part of the plaintiff; (3) a connection between
the enrichment and the impoverishment; (4) an absence of justification
or cause for the enrichment and impoverishment; and (5) the unavail-
ability of any other legal remedy. The case of Creely v. Leisure Living,
Inc.17 dramatizes the difficulty in pursuing an actio de in rem verso.
Upon a suit initiated by the attorney-notary who passed an act of
sale of immovable property to determine the rightful claimant to a real
estate commission between the builder/seller, Leisure Living, Inc. ("Lei-
sure Living"), and the real estate broker, Jesse Martin Realty Mart, a
demand of unjust enrichment was made by the realtor. Factually, Leisure
Living had entered into a six-month listing agreement with Jesse Martin
Realty Mart on July 24, 1979, in an effort to sell five houses in a
particular subdivision in Jefferson Parish. On October 24, 1979, an
agreement to purchase a home to be constructed by Leisure Living was
executed by prospective purchasers. The contract bore the Jesse Martin
Realty Mart letterhead and included a typical condition of financing.
The contract also specified that the purchase of the house to be built
was "predicated on sale of purchaser's home . . . listed for sale with
Jesse Martin Realty Mart." 88 Loan approval for the house to be con-
structed was not secured by the stipulated deadline, January 8, 1980,
through no fault of any party to the contract. Thus, the agreement to
buy was no longer enforceable.
The prospective vendees apparently told the agent for Jesse Martin
Realty Mart that they had decided to purchase elsewhere directly from
a builder. In truth, the potential buyers were disenchanted with the real
estate broker and were concerned about the broker's loyalty to Leisure
Living. In late January of 1980, the loan application made by the
prospective purchasers in connection with the October 24, 1979, agreement
was approved. The attorney-notary for the lender discovered that the
purchase agreement had lapsed, and he contacted the borrowers-pur-
chasers to learn whether or not a release had been prepared. A release
subsequently was signed on behalf of Leisure Living and by the pro-
spective purchasers; the agent for Jesse Martin Realty Mart then returned
the deposit given at the time of the execution of the agreement to buy.
At trial, the agent for Jesse Martin Realty Mart testified that she
85. 251 La. 624, 205 So. 2d 422 (1967).
86. 289 So. 2d 116 (La. 1974).
87. 437 So. 2d 816 (La. 1983).
88. Id. at 818.
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was under the impression the purchasers were buying directly from
another builder. To the contrary, a new purchase agreement was executed
by Leisure Living and the purchasers for the same property covered by
the lapsed contract of October 24, 1979. No mention was made of any
realtor's commission to be paid by the seller. The act of sale was passed
on March 18, 1980. At that time, the attorney-notary, anticipating Jesse
Martin Realty Mart might claim a commission, withheld monies from
the sale, and instituted the concursus proceeding. In rejecting the con-
tention of unjust enrichment raised by Jesse Martin Realty Mart the
supreme court failed to discern an absence of justification or cause for
the enrichment and impoverishment, since "the agent had no legal right
to the fee either under contract or under our jurisprudence concerning
procuring cause ... ."89 Accordingly,
the profit that the builder enjoyed on the sale of his property
after expending time, money, and energy to complete construc-
tion of the house is not a windfall, nor somehow undeserved.
Rather it is a profit to which he is properly entitled. Admittedly
this profit is increased slightly by his not paying a commission.
But, as discussed before, there was no obligation on his part,
by contract or otherwise to pay a commission.90
No flaw is apparent in the analysis of the supreme court,
demonstrating the problems in pursuing the actio de in rem verso. Never-
theless, the claim of unjust enrichment continues to be raised as one of
last resort. Perhaps a strong judicial message is necessary to show clearly
the strict limitations, and the reasons therefore, 9 upon the action.
Interference with Contractual Relations
Although this is a subject more properly covered in another part of
this Symposium, twice during the past term the supreme court indicated
that intentional and willful interference with contractual relations should
be actionable,9" notwithstanding the holding in Forcum-James Co. v. Duke
Transportation Co.93 If this laudible change does come about in the near
89. Id. at 822-23. The jurisprudence on the subject of procuring cause is canvassed
in Comment, The Law of Real Estate Brokerage Contracts: The Broker's Commission,
41 La. L. Rev. 857, 899-904 (1981).
90. Id. at 823.
91. Ironically, Professor Nicholas, the author of the very influential article on unjust
enrichment which likely prompted the revival of the interest in the action, commented
in-depth on the "reasons for the hostility which the doctrine . . . has sometimes en-
countered." Nicholas, Unjustified Enrichment in the Civil Law and Louisiana (pt. 1), 36
Tul. L. Rev. 605, 606 (1962). It is submitted that a more hostile response by the courts
is justified to the meritless invocations of the actio de in rem verso.
92. Sanborn v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 448 So. 2d 91, 95 n.5 (La. 1984); PPG
Indus., Inc. v. Bean Dredging, 447 So. 2d 1058, 1059 n.l (La. 1984).
93. 231 La. 953, 93 So. 2d 228 (1957).
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future, the law of Louisiana finally would be aligned with the rule prevail-
ing in every other jurisdiction in this country, as was noted by Professor
Malone twenty years ago. 9
4
94. Malone, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1963-1964 Term-
Torts, 25 La. L. Rev. 334, 341 (1965) ("Unfortunately, Louisiana is the only remaining
American jurisdiction where the malicious inducement of a breach of contract is not
regarded as an actionable wrong.").
